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Organizational change inevitably involves uncertainty and some degree of risk 
taking. What organizational conditions are associated with greater risk taking? 
This article examines the relationship between organizational slack and risk-
taking behaviour. To the degree that slack is associated with risk taking, the 
presence or absence of slack is relevant to organizational change. To the degree 
that organizational change leads to the creation or reduction in slack, future 
risk-taking behaviour may be altered. 
Traditional theories in economics and finance argue that individuals and 
organizations are risk adverse and that higher-risk projects or strategies will 
be undertaken only if there is a commensurate higher expected return. Such 
theories suggest that over the long run a positive association between risk and 
return should be exhibited. However, studies of the within-industry relationship 
between risk and return indicate that the observed relationship is most often 
negative (Bowman, 1980; Treacy, 1980). Termed the "risk-return paradox" 
(Bowman, 1982), this inverse relationship has been addressed by various authors 
(Cyert and March, 1963; March, 1981; March and Shapira, 1982) and can perhaps 
be explained in terms of a satisficing level of firm performance (March and Simon, 
1958; Simon, 1976). Simply put, firms performing above their satisficing level 
may prefer a low risk (low variance) decision because it reduces the probability 
that subsequent performance will fall below the satisficing level, while firms 
performing below their satisficing level may prefer a high risk (high variance) 
decision because it increases the probability that subsequent performance will 
fall above the satisficing level. 
Singh (1983, 1986) cited evidence both supporting and rejecting the hypothesis 
that poor performance motivates increased risk taking and argued that the 
contradictory empirical findings occur because performance and risk taking are 
linked in a complex manner. He posited two conceptually distinct processes 
that link performance and risk taking. In his model, good performance has a 
negative direct impact on risk taking because of the role of the satisficing level, 
mentioned above. On the other hand, there is also a positive impact, mediated 
by organizational slack. First, good performance increases organizational slack; 
then increased slack provides the opportunity for increased risk taking. Singh 
(1986) tested his model and found tentative support for both processes; measures 
of performance were negatively associated with some measures of risk, but 
performance was also positively associated with slack, which was positively 
associated with risk. 
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Slack and Risk Taking 
This article focuses on the relationship between slack and risk taking — one 
link in the Singh model — and presents a test of the hypothesis that increases 
in organizational slack are followed by more risky strategic decisions. 
Slack implies the presence of resources in excess of what is required for 
"normal" efficient operation of a firm (Bourgeois, 1981). Greater risk implies 
greater uncertainty surrounding the future outcome of a present decision. The 
case for a positive relationship between slack and risk taking rests on the 
contention that slack allows the firm to interact with its environment more boldly 
(Bourgeois, 1981) and permits experimentation by providing a buffer against 
downside risk (Singh, 1986). This view follows from work on the relationship 
between slack and innovation: Hambrick and Snow (1977) suggest that slack 
provides the opportunity to experiment with new products or markets. 
Thompson (1969) argues that slack results in the legitimacy of experimentation 
being questioned less. Some support for these arguments are found in Mohr 
(1969) and Rosner (1968). Cyert and March (1963) argue that slack reduces 
the problem of scarce resources and supplies the funds for innovations that 
would not be possible given scarcity. Consequently, slack reduces the criteria 
by which actions are judged acceptable. They also see slack as a pool of 
emergency resources which can be used to absorb potential variability and 
uncertainty in a firm's environment. 
While, like Singh (1983, 1986), this article empirically tests the relationship 
between slack and risk taking, there are differences between the approaches 
used. First, Singh tested for associations between slack and global measures 
of risk (developed from a questionnaire). This study instead isolates a specific 
strategic decision, characterizes alternatives in terms of risk, and tests for 
associations between slack and the alternative adopted. In short, the focus is 
on a specific, identifiable action. Second, Singh tested for contemporaneous 
associations between slack and risk measures. This study investigates the 
association between changes in slack and subsequent risk-taking behaviour. 
It may be more defensible to argue for a cause-effect association when the 
potential effect (risk taking) is observed at a point in time following the presumed 
cause (slack). Third, this study incorporates a wider set of measures to reflect 
slack and provides an analysis of the relationships between those measures. 
The specific strategic decision addressed in this study is pricing strategy for 
new products. Pricing strategy is investigated in a particular industry (aerospace) 
for a particular product type (major weapon systems) sold in a particular market 
(sales to the US Department of Defense). 
Pricing Strategies 
Skimming and Penetration 
Firms introducing new products or technology typically use one of two broad 
product pricing approaches: penetration or skimming. Discussed by many authors 
(Albaum, 1975; Caferelli, 1980; Dean, 1969; James, 1969; Wasson, 1974; Wind, 
1982), the two strategies are widely understood and used by business 








calls for high initial prices followed by lower prices at later stages. The objective 
of the skimming strategy is to achieve the maximum profit in the shortest time 
by charging the highest price that the market will bear. Thus one advantage 
of skimming is a more rapid return on investment. In contrast, the penetration 
strategy calls for a low initial price with little or no price reduction over time. 
The objective of the penetration strategy is to develop wide product demand 
rapidly through a low initial price. Once a market has been established, the 
firm can take advantage of either price increases or cost reductions to earn 
additional profits. 
Each of the two strategies can be described in terms of the relationship 
between two variables: the price of the first unit sold and the rate of price 
reduction over time. Skimmers exhibit a high first unit price and a steep price 
reduction curve, while penetrators exhibit a low first unit price and a flat price 
reduction curve. 
Pricing Strategy and Risk 
The two strategies differ in the timing of profits (short-term versus long-term) 
and consequently in riskiness. With a high initial price, skimming maximizes 
short-term returns and provides a more rapid recovery of funds to finance the 
costs of product introduction and future expansion Games, 1969). By front-ending 
profit, skimming reduces the risk associated with uncertainty in the product's 
market (Dean, 1969). Skimming allows for greater flexibility; it is typically easier 
to introduce a product with a high price and then reduce the price as knowledge 
of the market is gained than it is to introduce at a low price and increase price 
later to cover unexpected costs or exploit product popularity (Dean, 1969). 
Skimming emphasizes short-run profits and consequently reduces the risks 
associated with predicting future demand and future costs. 
The penetration strategy sacrifices short-run profits in an attempt to establish 
a market and generate profits over the long run. Penetration generally requires 
a greater commitment of the firm's resources, both because its long-run 
orientation may require greater investment in productive capacity and because 
the required investment may not be adequately financed out of the relatively 
lower initial profits (Caferelli, 1980). "High rewards are possible with this strategy 
but only if economies of scale occur as predicted. Therefore, it is often a high 
risk strategy as well, since the potential exists for disastrous losses if costs 
fail to decline as rapidly as expected. Production problems or unrealized sales 
volume can also undermine this strategy" (Small Business Report, 1985, p. 
77). Penetration appears to be the more risky strategy. 
Pricing Strategy in the US Defence Market 
Clearly defence contracting, particularly for major weapons systems, is 
specialized in nature. If competition to produce a major weapon system exists 
at all, that competition usually is based on system capability, not price. First, 
a contractor is selected to produce a weapon system. Then price is determined 
by negotiation and a contract agreed upon prior to actual production. Prices 





using some agreed upon formula. Hence, prices may seem to be a direct function 
of costs incurred, with little leeway allowed for contractor pricing discretion. 
However, prior research has explained how contractors may use accounting 
procedures to alter the pattern of costs incurred over time and hence "cost 
justify" different pricing strategies (Greer, 1983, 1984, 1985; Moses, 1991). 
Shifting costs to early years of a programme (and away from later years) justifies 
a relatively high initial price (and results in a declining price in later years) — 
consistent with skimming. Shifts costs away from early years is consistent with 
penetration. 
A contractor for a new weapon system has two alternatives. The firm can 
skim to ensure profitability and the recovery of invested funds in the short run. 
Or the firm can agree to a low intitial price, "buying-in" to the programme 
(sometimes at an initial loss) in an attempt to get the programme established. 
The firm then presumes that subequent renegotiation or future contracts will 
result in satisfactory profits in the long run. 
The penetration strategy has been argued to be more risky (Moses, 1989). 
The complexity, innovation, and high performance requirements associated with 
major weapon systems mean that their capability and reliability cannot always 
be assessed in advance. This creates uncertainties with respect to product 
acceptance and the future demand for additional units. Furthermore, the 
constantly changing economic and political environment creates uncertainties 
with respect to the willingness of congress or the executive branch to budget 
for additional units. This results in uncertainties with respect to programme 
curtailment or termination. Technical, political and economic consideration also 
affect the readiness of the Department of Defense to renegotiate[1]. Using pricing 
strategy as a strategic decision and treating penetration as the more risky 
strategy, the central hypothesis calls for a positive association between increases 
in organizational slack and adoption of the penetration strategy. 
Sample, Data, Measures 
The Slope of the Price Reduction Curve 
As indicated before, the two strategies can be described in terms of the 
relationship between first unit price and the subsequent price reduction curve. 
Learning curves can be used to distinguish the two strategies. Learning curves 
were fit to actual price histories (in constant dollars) to create a measure of 
the slope of the price reduction curve. 
This approach to operationalize pricing strategy follows prior research (Greer, 
1985; Moses, 1989, 1991). Relatatively high slope values (flat slope) are consistent 
with penetration while lower slope values (steeper price reduction) are consistent 
with skimming. Given the central hypothesis that slack is associated with the 
more risky penetration strategy, a positive association between slack and price 
reduction slopes is predicted. 
Sample 
Pricing strategies for major weapon systems were selected for examination 




segment of a contractor's business. Pricing strategy for such items is likely 
to be an important strategic decision. Two cost handbooks (Crawford, 1984; 
DePuy, 1983), containing cost history data for 126 distinct aerospace weapon 
system programmes — virtually the entire population of such programmes for 
a three-decade period — was the starting point for developing the sample. 
Programmes were deleted from the sample for the following reasons: First, 
programmes were excluded if price histories were not available for at least three 
years (n = 42). Three years of data were necessary in order to calculate 
meaningful price reduction slopes. Second, programmes where learning curves 
fit to the price history data provided a poor "fit" were eliminated (n = 8). 
Since the objective was to use price reduction curves to reflect pricing strategy; 
only programmes with well defined price reduction slopes were included. An 
R2 value in excess of 0.6 was used as a cutoff for programme inclusion. Third, 
some weapon systems had multiple manufacturers and the handbooks provided 
no separate price history by manufacturer. Since pricing strategy of individual 
firms is of interest, these programmes were not useful (n = 9). Fourth, 
programmes were deleted if financial statement data for the manufacturer were 
not available for two years prior to the start of the programme (n = 13). The 
primary reason for the lack of financial data was that some manufacturers were 
privately held. The surviving sample consisted of 53 programmes. 
The Measurement of Organizational Slack 
The concept of slack is widely used in the organizational theory and business 
strategy literatures, but there is no single consensus definition. However, most 
definitions suggest the idea of "excess" resources that provide "buffers" or 
"opportunities". Slack thus involves excess resources rather than just total 
resources. Because excess resources are difficult to identify, operationalizing 
measures of slack for empirical purposes has proved to be problematic and 
approaches have varied widely. Individual accounting-based measures, such as 
the level of expenditures (DePuy, 1983), operating expenses (Wolf, 1971), return 
on investment (Litschert, 1978, Odell, 1972), profit (Dimick and Murray, 1978), 
and sales (Litschert, 1978), have most frequently been employed. Each of these 
individual measures uses a rather narrow aspect of a firm's condition as a proxy 
for the broader excess resources concept implied by slack. 
Research by Bourgeois and Singh (1983, 1986) has developed a composite 
set of measures, based on publicly available financial accounting data, to capture 
slack. They offer a three-category formulation of the dimensions of slack, which 
rests on the idea of "ease-of-recovery": 
(1) Available slack: Resources not yet assimilated into the technical design 
of the organization (e.g. excess liquidity). 
(2) Recoverable slack: Resources that have been absorbed into the system 
as excess costs, but may be recovered (e.g. excess overhead costs). 
(3) Potential slack: The capacity of the organization to generate extra 





Bourgeois and Singh (1983) provided several accounting based measures within 
each category. The specific measures used in this study follow their framework 
(with modifications noted below) and are outlined in Table I. 
Some comment on the individual measures is perhaps necessary. Bourgeois 
(1981) said that the extent to which resources generated by profits are distributed 
as dividends or retained is a matter of managerial policy and provides a source 
of slack. He suggested that "net income minus dividends" or the "change in 
retained earnings" scaled by sales, are appropriate measures of slack from this 
source. Neither dividend nor retained earnings data was available for the sample. 
Two measures, Profit Margin and Equity Change, are designed to approximate 
his measures using data that was available. 
Working Capital measures the net resources the organization has tied up in 
current or operating assets, relative to the level of activity. Ceteris paribus, large 
stores of current resources (e.g. cash, receivables, inventories) should be an 
indication of slack. Relying on the "ease-of-recovery" idea, Bourgeois and Singh 
(1983) decomposed Working Capital into three separate measures: Quick Assets, 
Receivables and Inventory. All four measures, then, are conceptually related and 
all capture aspects of the level of current resources relative to activity. 
Fixed Assets extends the concept of resources relative to the activity level 
to non-current assets. Non-current assets reflect capacity and, when deflated 
by sales, may capture excess capacity. Bourgeois (1981) discussed excess capacity 
as an indicator of slack, but measures related to plant, equipment and other non-
current assets were omitted in the Bourgeois and Singh framework. 
General Expense measures the level of selling and administrative expenses 
relative to activity and captures the idea that slack is absorbed in various period 
costs such as salaries. 
Current Debt and Long-term Debt are both measures of capital structure and 

















Change in stockholder equity/sales 
(Cash + marketable securities — current 
liabilities)/sales 
(Current assets — current liabilities)/sales 
Accounts receivable/sales 
Inventory/sales 
Selling and administration expense/sales 
Non-current assets/sales 
Current liabilities/stockholder equity 

















from the environment by short or long term financing. (Analogous measures 
scaled by sales or total assets provided similar findings.) 
Some comments on the variables collectively are necessary. The 
Bourgeois/Singh measurement framework is designed to generate relative rather 
than absolute measures of slack. The measures are relative in two senses: 
First, they incorporate a control for size or the level of organizational activity 
(generally by deflating by sales). Second, the measures are designed to be used 
in measuring changes in the amount of slack in a system over time. Focusing 
on the change in slack is important. Theories linking strategic behaviour to 
slack tend to see behaviour as a reaction to increases or decreases in slack 
rather than its absence or presence (Bourgeois, 1981). This is the case in the 
innovation literature (Cyert, 1963; Kay, 1979; Thompson, 1969) from which Singh 
developed his hypothesis concerning slack and risk taking. Bourgeois argues 
that it is more valid — from the standpoint of causal inference — to observe 
behaviour following changes in slack than to cross-sectionally compare behaviour 
among firms based on differences in the amount of slack[2]. 
To capture change in slack, each of the measures in Table I (except Profit, 
Margin, Equity Change and General Expense) were transformed as follows: 
where t = one-year prior to programme start. 
These change measures conceptually indicate the change in slack during the 
period from two years to one year prior to production and delivery of items 
manufactured by a contractor under a weapon system acquisition programme. 
Profit Margin, Equity Change and General Expense (measured one year prior 
to programme start) were not transformed because they already reflect "flows" 
of resources into or out of an organization over a period of time and consequently 
provide direct proxies for change in slack. 
Control Variables 
In Singh's investigation (1983, 1986) of risk-taking discussed earlier, performance 
was positively associated with slack and slack positively associated with risk 
taking, but performance alone was negatively associated with risk taking. This 
suggests a need to control for firm performance. An overall measure of firm 
performance, Return on Stockholders' Equity, was calculated for each firm in 
the year prior to product introduction. The expectation was for a negative 
relationship between Return and risk taking and thus a negative association 
with price reduction slope. 
Pricing strategy can be expected to be associated with many additional factors, 
such as competition, industry and general economic conditions, the political 
environment, and the nature of the product. A preliminary study (Moses, 1989) 
was conducted to identify factors explaining pricing strategy on defence 
programmes in the aerospace industry. Results of that study indicated that five 





of these five factors were additionally included as controls. The five variables 
(and their expected association with the dependent variable, price reduction 
slope) are as follows: 
(1) The growth in industry capacity utilization prior to programme initiation 
(-); 
(2) The level of defence spending prior to programme initiation (-); 
(3) The initial (first year) government appropriations for a programme (+); 
(4) Programme length (+); 
(5) Whether a programme was a "follow-on" modification of a previous 
programme (+). 
Discussion of the links between these variables and pricing strategy, as well 
as issues related to measuring the variables are contained in the earlier study. 
Analysis 
The Interrelationship among Slack Measures 
Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations for the slack variables are 
presented in Table II. The ten measures of slack are each designed to reflect 
changes in slack resouces during the period shortly before production and 
delivery of items occurs. Given the multiple measures, two questions arise: 
Are the measures independent? and do the three categories (available, 
recoverable, potential) provided in the Bourgeois and Singh framework represent 
distinct dimensions of slack? Observation of the table indicates that 20 of the 
45 pairwise correlations are significant and the associations between measures 
cut across the three categories. Consequently the assumption of independent 
measures and distinct categories of measures appears inappropriate. 
To analyse the interrelationships a factor analysis was conducted. Principal 
components factor analysis with varimax rotation (retaining factors with 
eigenvalues greater than one) resulted in four factors with the factor loading 
pattern reported in Table III. Each variable (except Quick Assets) is 
unambiguously associated with a single one of the four factors. Given the 
significant interrelationships between the individual slack measures, factor scores 
were used in the subsequent analysis. Consequently, some explanation of the 
dimensions is necessary. 
Factor 1 (Investment) captures both decreases in slack (as measured by Quick 
Assets) and increases in slack (Receivables, Inventory, Fixed Assets). As an 
overall indicator of slack change, its meaning is ambiguous. However, an 
interesting pattern exists. Quick Assets is as a measure of available slack. The 
other three variables fall within the recoverable slack category. Instead of 
indicating an overall increase or decrease in slack, factor 1 captures a shift in 
terms of "ease of recovery". Factor 1 indicates an "investment" of liquid 
resources into a form that is less readily available. This permits a test of a 
secondary hypothesis. Singh (1983, 1986) found that risk taking was associated 
with measures of recoverable slack but not with measures of available slack. 






1. Profit margin 
2. Equity change 
3. Quick assets 
4. Working capital 
5. Receivables 
6. Inventory 
7. General expense 
8. Fixed assets 
9. Current debt 
10. Long-term debt 
* p< 0.05 
** p< 0.01 






































































































































































Factor Pattern — Slack 
Measures 
a different, and lesser, psychological role in motivating risk taking. Since factor 
1 measures a shift away from available slack to less easily recovered slack, if 
Singh's conclusion holds in the current study, one would expect a positive 
association between factor 1 and risk taking. 
Profit Margin and Equity Change both load postively on factor 2. It was 
explained previously that they are two alternative proxies for the same idea 
(excess resources generated through profitable operations). Long-term Debt 
loads negatively. The link between the three is interpretable. Profitable 
operations (Profit Margin) should be reflected in increases in stockholders' equity 
(Equity Change) which, ceteris paribus, should result in a decreasing proportion 
of debt in a firm's capital structure (Long-term Debt). Thus factor 2 seems 
to reflect relative changes in the source of "Financing" from debt to equity. 
Given the hypothesized relationship of each of the three slack variables with 
risk taking, the expected association of factor 2 with risk taking is unambiguous. 
A positive sign is hypothesized. 
The three variables loading on factor 3 (Funds) are readily associated. 
Decreases in current liabilities should cause increases in the net liquid (Quick) 
asset of a firm and the net working capital. The label "funds" denotes the 
liquid or operating resources of a firm. A positive association of factor 3 with 
risk taking is hypothesized. 
Only one variable loads on factor 4 (Expense) so a positive association with 
risk taking, consistent with the expected sign for the individual variable, is 
hypothesized. 
The Association of Changes in Slack with Pricing Strategy 
Table IV shows pairwise correlations between the slack factors and the control 
variables. While some correlations are significant, the most important association 
would appear to be between Return and Financing (0.73). The effects of this 




























* p< 0.05 
**p< 0.01 


























































































To test for relationships with pricing strategy, a forward stepwise regression 
was run, regressing price reduction slopes on the slack factors and the control 
variables. Individual variables were allowed to enter the regression as long as 
their coefficients were significant (p < 0.05) and the adjusted R2 of the model 
increased. Both these criteria were met for six variables. The resulting model[3] 
is in Table V. 
Observation of Table V shows that three control variables explain pricing 
strategy, and each has the hypothesize sign. Of more direct interest, three slack 
factors are also significantly associated with pricing strategy[4]. The positive 
association of Funds with price reduction slope indicates a tendency for firms 
with increases in excess liquid resources to adopt the penetration strategy. The 
positive sign for Expense indicates that firms with excess resources tied up 
in period expenses also adopt penetration. The sign for Investment is contrary 
to hypothesis. The findings suggest that as excess resources are shifted from 
liquid form toward investment in less liquid assets adoption of the penetration 
strategy is less, rather than more, likely. 
Discussion 
Central Hypothesis 
Findings from the study are consistent with the central hypothesis. Increase 
in slack, as measured by Funds and Expense, was associated with the adoption 
of the more risky penetration pricing strategy. This supports the conclusions 
of Singh (1983, 1986) that organizational slack and risk taking are related. There 
are two broad implications of the result. First, it emphasizes the importance 
of organizational variables such as slack in risk-taking behaviour. Traditional 
economic theories of risk taking typically emphasize the risk versus expected 
return aspects of decision alternatives and stress the trade-offs between the 
two. In theory, alternatives can be assessed in terms of risk and expected return 










F Value: 7.33 
Significance: 0.0001 
* p < 0.05 
** p < 0.01 
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there is a compensating greater expected return. Decision makers can be 
perceived as having an indifference curve which describes the trade-offs they 
are willing to accept. The indifference curve is exogenous. The results here 
suggest that slack is a variable that influences how the risk/return trade-off 
may be made. In short, slack may be an organizational variable that influences 
the shape of the indifference curve. 
Second, the results reinforce the notion of slack as a variable having behavioural 
consequences for the firm. Risk taking is likely permitted because slack provides 
the source of resources to cushion or absorb failure. Given such behavioural 
effects of slack, one might question the completeness of organizational theories 
(Wolf, 1971), economic views (Leibenstein, 1976; Shelton, 1967) and 
accounting/budgeting studies (Lowe and Shaw, 1968; Schiff and Lewin, 1970, 
1967) that stress efficiency and consequently assume that slack is necessarily 
undesirable. 
On the Dimensions and Measurement of Slack 
The Bourgeois and Singh (1983) measurement framework was used initially 
to identify measures of slack. While the arguments underlying their three ease-
of-recovery categories are intuitively appealing, the findings from the correlation 
and factor analysis indicate that the different categories are not empirically 
distinct. Interrelationship between the various individual slack measures is not 
entirely unexpected; year-to-year changes in a firm would likely be captured 
by various measures. The implications are twofold: First, a warning. Attempting 
to draw conclusions about the separate roles of "available", "recoverable" or 
"potential" slack by using a single measure from one of the categories would 
be inappropriate; measures from different categories co-vary. Second, an 
opportunity. Since the measures co-vary, a subset of the measures used in 
this study may adequately capture some important dimensions of slack. 
With this in mind, some specific results from Singh (1983, 1986) seem relevant. 
He found two measures of slack (Working Capital and General Expense) 
significantly associated with risk taking. In this study, those same two measures 
had the highest loadings on the Funds and Expense factors, which similarly 
proved to be significantly associated with risk taking. This suggests that the 
level of working capital and the level of selling, administrative and operating 
expenses of a firm may be appropriate places to start when attempting to 
operationalize slack[5]. Future research is perhaps necessary to establish 
whether these two dimensions of slack are consistent predictors of strategic 
actions in other situations or even if they represent distinct factors in other 
samples. However, studies of financial ratios (Chen and Shimerda, 1981) indicate 
that these two dimensions align well with distinct factors that have been shown 
to consistently exist in financial accounting data. 
Absorbed Slack, Unabsorbed Slack and Risk Taking 
While Working Capital and General Expense were associated with risk taking 
in the Singh study, a third variable he tested, Quick Assets, was not. From 





risk taking but unabsorbed (available) slack has no effect. The findings reported 
here are not consistent with that conclusion. The Investment factor directly 
reflected a shift of excess resources from liquid to less liquid form, i.e. a shift 
from unabsorbed to absorbed slack. And that shift was inversely related to risk 
taking. It is possible that once resources are absorbed by organizational activities 
they are less readily available to cushion the firm against risks. Williamson (1963) 
suggests this view, implying that slack, once absorbed, is not readily recovered 
because managers are hesitant to yield the benefits derived from slack. 
Admittedly, the two studies differ with respect to industries, and the method 
of operationalizing risk taking. The appropriate inference may be that it is 
premature to draw final conclusions with respect to the relative importance 
of absorbed and unabsorbed slack as strategic variables. 
Performance and Risk Taking 
While not of central interest to this study, the finding that adoption of the 
penetration strategy was inversely associated with organizational performance 
(Return) is also of note. This confirms the findings of others (Bowman, 1980, 
1982; Singh, 1983, 1986; Treacy, 1980) that risk taking and performance may 
be negatively related, and is consistent with theories that see risk taking as 
dependent on the relationship between the level of actual performance and the 
satisficing level. Recall that Singh's model of the relationship between 
performance and risk taking called for both direct and indirect (mediated by 
slack) links. The findings for the Return variable are supportive of the direct 
link Singh hypothesized. 
Concluding Remarks 
The broad conclusions of this study can be briefly summarized as follows: 
(1) Increases in organizational slack appear to be followed by more risky 
decisions; 
(2) Slack is a multi-dimensional construct, but focusing on the level of working 
capital and expenses appears to provide measures of slack that are useful 
in explaining strategic behaviour; 
(3) The relative role of absorbed versus unabsorbed slack in motivating risk 
taking behaviour is an open question. 
These conclusions must be tempered by two limitations. First only one specific 
risk-taking decision, product pricing strategy, was investigated. The choice of 
pricing strategy for the sample firms investigated was not a trivial one; the 
monetary value of the defence programmes involved was large. Nonetheless, 
only one type of strategic decision was examined; additional research is required 
to explore the links between slack and other types of risky decisions. 
Second, while financial accounting-based variables have been widely used 
in past research to measure slack, such measures are only proxies for the idea 
of "excess" resources implied by the slack concept. Conclusions should be 




alternative measures (perhaps developed via questionnaires or interviews of 
organizational members) would be a useful direction for future research. 
Two other directions for future research are also apparent. One is the relative 
role of absorbed and unabsorbed slack mentioned above. Does the ease of 
recovery of slack matter and how? The second follows from a look at the 
difference between the penetration and skimming pricing strategies used in this 
study. While they differ in risk, they also tend to differ in long-run versus short-
run orientation. Perhaps the presence of slack, by relaxing short-run pressures, 
permits the firm to take a long-run view. Tests of the relationship of slack to 
other decisions where a long-run/short-run choice is apparent may provide insight 
on this issue. 
Notes 
1. There are some risks for a firm that secures a contract with a skimming strategy. 
Contractors that skim may risk programme termination or curtailment due to excessive 
price, and may risk competitor entry by encouraging the government to seek lower prices 
elsewhere (termed "second sourcing"). But these risks are minimal. The high start-
up costs associated with the manufacture of major weapon systems typically make second 
sourcing an unattractive alternative for the government, and the flexibility afforded by 
the high initial price permits the skimmer to respond to termination threats with a price 
reduction. 
2. Since slack implies excess resources, not total resources, it is also more meaningful 
to use the measures to reflect changes in slack rather than the absolute amount of slack. 
As absolute measures of slack, the variables have meaning only if certain assumptions 
hold. Take for example Working Capital. If it is assumed, first, that there is some constant 
"necessary" level of working capital for a given firm when operations are "normal", 
second, that deviations from the necessary levels indicate slack, and, third, that firms 
in the same industry have the same necessary level, then cross-sectional differences 
in working capital (for firms in the same industry) would imply cross-sectional differences 
in slack. Although previous research has adopted these assumptions when measuring 
slack (Singh, 1983, 1986), they are strong assumptions. 
The measures are more meaningful when used to reflect changes in slack over time. 
It is more defensible to argue that there is some necessary level of a given measure 
for the "normal" operations of a particular firm. Then changes in the measures would 
reflect changes in slack for the particular firm. This is not unreasonable since the individual 
measures are adjusted for the level of activity (generally, by deflating by sales). Consider 
again Working Capital. Analysts usually project working capital needs as a constant 
percentage of sales (Bourgeois, 1981). If working capital increases at a faster rate than 
sales (i.e. an increase in Working Capital over time) then it is not unreasonable to assume 
that there is an increase in liquidity in excess of that necessary to support the increase 
in activity; in short, an increase in slack. Bourgeois and Singh indicated that their measures 
are most appropriate when used to reflect changes in slack. 
3. Two other approaches were attempted. First, instead of using factor scores, the individual 
slack variables that loaded highest on each factor (assumed to be representative of the 
factor) were used in the regression. Results were substantially the same; the variables 
representing factors 1, 3 and 4 were significant, while the variable representing factor 
2 was not. Second, an ordinary (non-stepwise) regression model including all slack factors 
and control variables was constructed. The only change from the model reported in Table 
V was that Return and Expense ceased to be significant. Given the collinearity between 
some of the variables (particularly Return and Financing), this is not surprising. When 
two highly correlated variables are included in the same regression the individual 





4. The fourth slack factor, Financing, was not significantly associated with pricing strategy. 
However, letting the stepwise procedure continue, it was the next variable to enter, 
with a negative coefficient (significant only at p = 0.29). Note that while a positive 
coefficient was hypothesized for Financing, a negative coefficient was hypothesized (and 
found) for the control variable Return, and recall that Financing and Return were highly 
correlated. This suggests that the Financing factor may be capturing aspects of firm 
performance confounding its meaningfulness as a measure of the increase in slack. 
5. It should also be noted that, in addition to different samples and methodological 
approaches, the Singh study also differed from this study in the specific manner of 
measuring slack. This study measured slack change over time. Singh measured the 
"amount" of slack for firms cross-sectionally. The fact that working capital and general 
expenses proved significant measures in both approaches tends to confirm their value. 
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